A
War Fraught With Controversy and Credibility Issues
Plan of Attack reviewed by Kevin Marek
Bob Woodward made his name almost thirty years ago by breaking the Watergate story that toppled a president. And it's probably been that long since one of his works has had such immediate political impact. Plan of Attack was heavily reviewed and something of a news event itself. After it was published, right-wing pundits called it an "anti-Bush screed," while Robert Kuttner, a prominent left-of-center commentator, blasted Bob Woodward for betraying his watchdog roots and becoming a shill for the current administration. It appears that President Bush is quite fond of the book, and recommends it to people.
There are reasons for the range of opinions. Woodward is noted for presenting information while keeping his own personality and opinions out of the way. For this reason, the book has something of the feel of a primary source: bald information that has to be interpreted to understand its import. There is virtually no political or social context for the events described, let alone any commentary or analysis by the author.
However, this is not a primary source, and the lack of context itself can be seen as part of the argument. This book deals on nothing else; it's all-Iraq, all the time. This necessarily distorts the presentation, making the administration's focus on the topic seem sinister to the point of obsessive. The reader has to wonder how much of this is intentional.
When the book came out there were certain sections that were discussed in many of the reviews, and here is a quick recap of them: the book describes how Bush told Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the US, that he had decided to invade Iraq before he told Colin Powell, the Secretary of State. Prince Bandar promised to make sure oil prices dropped comfortably before the election, to help Bush's chances in November. Powell felt that Vice-President Cheney was in "a fever" about Iraq. Bush went to a "higher father" than the former president for guidance about Iraq. Lastly, there was the diversion of funds that Congress had allocated for the war in Afghanistan. Bush & Co, without notifying Congress, diverted these funds to the invasion of Iraq, which is a clear infringement of congressional power. George Tenet, head of the CIA, said it was a "slam-dunk" that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. These were the supposed plum findings of Plan of Attack -- the inside information that came from Woodward's extensive access to the President, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleeza Rice, and many other prime members of the administration.
One point that wasn't brought out in earlier reviews, is the significance of the title. Most of the book is devoted to the development of the plan to attack Iraq. As such, the main actors are Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks, the general in charge of planning and executing the military operation. The amount of classified information made available to Woodward must have been staggering, because he presents the process in great detail. I suspect most readers may find some of this tedious, but it goes a long way towards explaining why Bush recommends the book. The planning was relentless and thorough, with Rumsfeld cast as the Boss From Hell who is never satisfied with the answers given. The military end of the operation, the "plan" of the title, went off with fewer problems than anyone had the right to expect. It is probably this attention to the careful planning that won Bush's approval.
Bush told all of his top advisors to cooperate and to sit for interviews with Woodward. It appears most complied, with the possible exception of Cheney. And, in Woodward's world, the reward for cooperating is to be treated well in the book. As a result, Dick Cheney is the undisputed villain of the piece, the eminence gris who skulked behind the scenes, the secretive, paranoid puppet master pulling Bush's strings.
There are two very significant events in which Woodward says Cheney pulled the strings. The book begins in November 2001, two months after the attacks of 9/11. In the opening scene, Bush pulls Rumsfeld aside and tells him to begin planning for an invasion of Iraq. Bush hadn't fully decided to attack Iraq yet, but he wanted a workable plan in place. Then, in 2002, came the debate on how to justify this invasion to America and the world. The key point was whether or not Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As late as August 20, 2002, Bush was publicly saying that Iraq might have, or probably had WMD, without being definitive. During this period Powell was working for a diplomatic solution to the situation, which meant going to the UN and sending weapons inspectors to Iraq. According to Woodward, Cheney was dead-set against this sort of negotiation, fearing that it would result in an endless cycle of debate, discussion, and no action. Apparently to prevent this, Cheney made a speech on August 26, 2002, in which he said, "simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction [and] there is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our allies and against us."
This was a pivotal moment. From then on, the qualifications evaporated and the administration began speaking, publicly at least, as if the proof of WMD was ironclad. What's more, this new certainty began to creep into the public discourse; columnists, polemicists, advocates all took up the "proven fact" theme and repeated it. More, proponents of invading Iraq became ever-more willing to use this "established fact" as a club to beat and bully anyone who even suggested that there were legitimate doubts. As for the book, Woodward offers no explanation for why no one within the administration seemed to call Cheney on this. There were further debates; most notably, Colin Powell went to the UN on Feb 5, 2003 to present the administration's case. There were, as Woodward said, "high-level officials with grave doubts, but their words were not heard" Rather, the "unambiguous pronouncements" of Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Tenet prevailed.
The second instance where it appeared that Cheney called the shots came right at the opening of the war. Beginning in December 2003, CIA operatives were working inside the borders of Iraq. The one station described in the book operated in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Northern Iraq. The station head's job was to recruit Iraqis to provide information-to spy for the US. The CIA was especially interested in anyone of rank or with a significant position, such as members of the Republican Guard, bodyguards of Saddam Hussein or his sons, or other connected persons. As part of his operation, the station head, nicknamed "Tim," was given literally millions of dollars in cash to bribe the locals. A million dollars in $100 dollar bills, Woodward says, weighs about 44 pounds and fits in a standard backpack. As the operation progressed, some of the more trusted spies began to ask for payment in smaller bills. The area had become so saturated with this bribe currency that a cup of coffee now cost $100 at the local cafes. No one could make change.
On Monday, March 17, 2003, Bush made a speech giving Saddam and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq. Failure to comply would mean an American attack. Within this 48-hour interlude, Tim's network provided what appeared to be excellent intelligence that Saddam and both his sons would be at a place called the Dora Farm. This farm was a compound outside of Baghdad that Saddam and his family used periodically. This intelligence about Saddam's location got priority clearance and was given to Washington, and made to the President and his inner circle. It looked like Bush had the chance to "decapitate" the regime by killing Saddam and both his sons. However, how much collateral damage-the euphemism for civilian casualties-would occur? Bush didn't want to start the war by killing children and the ultimatum hadn't expired. An intense debate raged for several hours; should they, or shouldn't they? At the time, Woodward says, Powell noticed that "things didn't really get decided until the president met with Cheney. Alone." After that, Bush ordered the attack and the war began.
When announcing this decision in a speech, Bush used words that are relevant to the current debate about whether or not Bush & Co lied about the connections between Iraq and Al Qaida. Bush claims that he never stated that Iraq had any hand in the attacks of 9/11, but fully 70% of Americans polled believed this to be true. In the speech that night, Bush said,
[Our intent is to] meet the threat now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of firefighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities.
This line had been deleted from the speech, but was put back in at the last minute. The speechwriter was pleased because "the implication of avoiding another 9/11 would be clear." This is the climax of the book, the last incident before the Epilogue.
Aside from implications and a few slightly more robust jabs at the administration, most of the damning information Woodward provides is in the Epilogue. The Epilogue describes circumstances a year later, in early 2004. The mood of the book shifts as David Kay, Bush's chief weapons inspector in Iraq, announced in January that there were no WMD in Iraq, eliminating one major justification for the war. On finding out about this, Powell speculated that this new information may have changed the decision made, and this musing made it into the papers through an anonymous source. Powell then got a call from Condoleeza Rice, who upbraided an official 20 years her senior and fourth in line to the presidency. Powell knew the message came from Bush, but he still didn't like it. Powell also noted that Rice was actually more interested in "finding someone to blame for the airing of the problem than fixing it." In other words, Powell noted, the administration was saying it was time to "circle the wagons."
Unlike his boss, Powell has had second thoughts. According to the book, he, and virtually he alone, had doubts about the war. He had doubts about the quality of the intelligence and about the idea of invading. Powell is the hero of this book, the Man Who Spoke the Truth while others pretended not to see. Woodward tells us that, as the war planning had progressed, Powell felt that the easier the war looked, the less Rumsfeld, the Pentagon, and Franks worried about the aftermath. Powell also felt that, once Bush and Rumsfeld "had to live with the consequences of their Iraq decisions, they were becoming dangerously protective of those decisions." In short, Bush, Rumsfeld, and Cheney were not willing to face the truth.
After the war, right up to the present, Bush has been steadfast and adamant that he made the right decision, that he did the right thing. "I haven't suffered any doubt," Bush told Tony Blair, British Prime Minister and Bush's only significant ally in the war. In his press conference in May, Bush did not/could not answer when he was asked if he had made any mistakes. In another context, he recently told Joe Biden, Democratic Senator from Delaware, "at least I make strong decisions." Woodward quotes Rumsfeld as saying that Bush "carries his responsibilities well," meaning he doesn't seem to be plagued by the sort of second-guessing to which reflective people are prone when making life-and-death decisions. When presented with the evidence of no evidence of WMD, with the ties between Al Qaida and Saddam refuted, proponents of the war, Bush among them, state that the world is better off without Saddam Hussein. This is undoubtedly true, but it's also beside the point.
And this is the crux of the book, and why it deserves much of the attention it has been given. The Iraq War began in controversy, and that controversy has not abated. Reasonable people still disagree on whether the war was justified, whether Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the rest lied to America, or at least, whether they misrepresented their case. This importance of this book is not how it stacks up as a work of literature, but whether it helps answer these questions. The book, in short, is relevant to the political discussion. It is important. It has something to say about the approaching election and whether the current administration suffers from a fatal credibility problem. Is the book for or against? I believe the overall tone and presentation argues against Bush, but the President of the United States does not agree with me. Who's right? It's trite, but the only way to answer this is to read the book for yourself. It won't be the most exciting thing you'll read this year, but it may be the most important. Just be prepared: the book may affect the way you vote this November.